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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
THE LIABILITY OF INFANTS FOR CRIMES.
At the common law an infant under the age of seven had no
capacity to commit a crime,' and the same rule has been embodied in
our Penal Law.2 Infants over seven and less than fourteen years of
age were in what Blackstone called the "Dubious Age of Discretion,"
and as to them clear evidence of understanding was required to repel
the presumption against capacity.3 This rule has likewise found
expression in our Penal Law, but the age has been limited to twelve.4
Where it has been possible to overcome the presumption against capa-
city, and to establish felonious intent as an independent fact, instances
may be cited, both at the common law and in the nineteenth century of
the conviction of infants for the crime of murder.5 Whether such a
conviction may be sustained if the finding of criminal intent is based
upon the commission of another felony is a question recently decided
in the negative by the Court of Appeals. 6
An infant under the age of sixteen was indicted in common-law
form for murder. The prosecution proved the commission of the
homicide while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of a
robbery. The trial judge charged the jury that their verdict must be
either guilty of murder in the first degree, or not guilty. The jury
convicted. On appeal the conviction was reversed and it was held
that an infant under the age of sixteen cannot be convicted of a
felony murder, unless the underlying felony was punishable by death
or by life imprisonment.
An indictment in common-law form stating the facts constituting
the crime and charging the killing to have been done by the defendant,
wilfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought is sufficient to
sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree, if the proof as to
manner of commission of the crime brings it within one of the statu-
tory definitions. 7 An infant under the age of sixteen may be guilty
of murder in the first degree, since it is punishable by death., In such
case every essential element of the crime, including felonious intent,
must be proved. This element of proof may be satisfied, ordinarily,
by showing that the act was done by one then engaged in the com-
1 1 WHARTON, CRImIN.AL LAW (12th ed. 1932) §85.
'N. Y. PENAL LAW §816.
'14 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 23; 36 L. R. A. 197.
4 N. Y. PENAL LAW §817.
1 HALE, P. C. 25, 26; State v. Aaron, 4 N. J. L. 231, 7 Am. Dec. 592
(1818); State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L. 193, 18 Am. Dec. 404 (1828); Godfrey v.
State, 31 Ala. 323, 70 Am. Dec. 494 (1858); Broadnax v. State, 100 Ga. 62,
25 S. E. 844 (1896).
0People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932).
7People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062 (1889) ; People v. Osmond,
138 N. Y. 80, 33 N. E. 739 (1893); People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 222, 129
N. E. 883 (1921); People v. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 615 (1927).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW §2186.
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mission of another felony. The intent to perpetrate one kind of
felony is transferred by implication to the homicide which has actually
been committed, so as to make the latter a killing with malice afore-
thought, contrary to the real facts of the case. 10 The independent
felony is established for purpose of characterizing the degree of the
crime charged. Thus the defendant's guilt is dependent upon his
having participated in the robbery with felonious intent. Since the
Legislature has decreed that all the acts committed by an infant,
other than those acts constituting a felony punishable by death or by
life imprisonment, shall be treated as though done without felonious
intent, such felonious intent, therefore, may not be gathered from the
participation in the robbery, and the conviction has been obtained
upon an intent which does not exist.1 That the defendant may in
fact have acted pursuant to the criminal intent is not an issue now,
for a conviction erroneously obtained on one theory may not be sus-
tained because it probably would have followed had the proper course
been pursued. 12
The liability of infants under the age of fourteen for felonies
other than those punishable by death or life imprisonment was first
modified in 1894, the court being granted the discretion to try the
charges as for a misdemeanor.' 3 In 1902 the age limit was raised to
sixteen 14 and in 1905 the court was deprived of its discretionary
power and such offenses became misdemeanors automatically. 15 The
present statute was enacted in 1909 and created a new classification
entirely, the act of the child dropping below the degree of statutory
crime, and becoming known as "Juvenile Delinquency." 16
Concurrently with this development in the substantive law was
the change wrought in the procedure upon the trial, and in the treat-
ment subsequently accorded the infant in an attempt to restore him to
a useful and satisfactory life. The first instance of legislative recog-
nition of the desirability of differentiating the methods of trial of an
adult from that of an infant is found in the laws of 1892, when
children under the age of sixteen were permitted separate trial, sep-
arate docket and separate record.17 In 1901 the legislature created a
Children's Court to be housed in separate buildings but the act
applied to New York City only.18 Subsequently the Children's Court
was given concurrent jurisdiction over all cases of adults contributing
0 People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, 68 (1884) ; People v. Nichols, supra note
7, at 226, 129 N. E. at 884.
'o People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 174 (N. Y., 1834).
"People v. Roper, supra note 6 at 178, 181 N. E. at 91.
People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 244, 133 N. E. 574, 575 (1921) ; People
v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 105, 158 N. E. 25, 37 (1927).
N. Y. LAws 1894, c. 726.
"N. Y. LAWS 1902, c. 103.
'IN. Y. LAws 1905, c. 655, §4.
11N. Y. LAws 1909, c. 478; People v. Pollack, 154 App. Div. 716, 139
N. Y. Supp. 831 (2d Dept. 1913).
" N. Y. LAWS 1892, c. 217.
IN. Y. LAws 1901, c. 466.
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to or responsible for the delinquency of children.19 Finally an amend-
ment to the State Constitution permitted the establishment of Chil-
dren's Courts in each county in the State.20 These are the major
steps which together with numerous other legislative enactments 21 have
combined to clothe the juvenile courts with some of the aspects of the
old English Court of Chancery in their informal dealings with the
child and its parent. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts over
the infant was based on the conception that the state owed a duty of
protection to the children of the realm. This duty the king delegated
to his chancellors.22 In this country the state has taken the place of
the king and the equity powers have been delegated to a specialized
court. The juvenile court may thus be seen as a growth in rather
than a departure from the parens patriac theory of the Chancery
Courts.23
On the other hand, from the standpoint of delinquency
jurisdiction the underlying purpose of extending the common law
age of criminal responsibility is evident since legal guilt is depen-
dent upon the nwns rea, which is in turn dependent upon age,
the extension of the common law rule by the widening of the age
limit is apparent. 24 Basically no distinction exists between the crime
committed by the infant at common law, and the act of the delinquent
today, for intent was necessary then to stamp the infant a criminal,
and is necessary today to stamp the infant a delinquent. The differ-
ence lies in the resulting treatment accorded the child today. Recog-
nizing the fact that in a vast majority of the cases, the impelling
cause of the criminal act is rooted in evil associations, poor family
surroundings, and other circumstances beyond the control of the
infant, the state calling for its own benefit, as well as the child's, has
refused to stigmatize the offendor by calling him a criminal, but has
provided for him under the less opprobrious name, delinquent.25 The
net result of such a policy has been not to make the act less criminal
in fact but arbitrarily to call it something else. The soundness of the
decision in the instant case is indisputable when viewed in the light of
such a policy.
HENRY J. PLITKIN.
'IN. Y. LAWS 1903, c. 331.
N. Y. Constitution amending art. VI, §8.
21 N. Y. LAWS 1903, c. 613 (probation officers and their duties); N. Y.
LAWS 1919, c. 416 (as to place of confinement); N. Y. LAWS 1922, c. 547
(granting court wide discretion in disposal of case; provision for mental and
physical examination of each child).
6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW, 648.
Flexner, Legal Aspects of the Jutvenile Court (1923) 57 AM. L. REV. 65.
H. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE U. S. (1927).
' People v. Roper, .rnpra note 6 at 177, 181 N. E. 91.
